Other Work   2008-2010

Consider an object – a pair of scissors for example. But before you do, consider the mind that considers those scissors. Consider the mind which experiences itself as distinct from everything and everyone else… a distinct subject, oriented towards discrete objects, objects such as those scissors… those scissors which cut, separate, and divide. Can it possibly be that the mind is both the consequence of the conspicuous difference between itself and everything and everyone else, and that the mind is also a precondition of all apparent differences? Do the contours of the mind give shape to the world, or do the contours of the world give shape to the mind?

And as I become aware of those scissors, when they are signified as scissors, they detach and differ from everything and everyone else, taking on their own local identity and specific meaning. As I experience them, they disentangle themselves from other objects, making them distinct, placing them in time, setting them in space, and allowing an understanding of their qualities and quantities to emerge. They are useful too. They multiply the content of the world by dividing things into discrete and distinct forms, thus initiating a mellifluous plurality.